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(UN-)INTERPRETABILITY IN EXPERT EVIDENCE:  




ABSTRACT: Evidence law regimes across several contemporary legal orders provide a host of doctrinal 
devices designed to probe various sorts and sources of information, especially with respect to their 
accuracy and reliability. These legal provisions, however, are vulnerable to or even tolerant towards 
uninterpretable evidence, that is evidence whose probative value cannot be assessed. This article 
critically examines and discusses the «littering paths» of uninterpretable evidence in legal proceed-
ings. We point out the misinformative character of such evidence as well as the potentially mis-
leading impact on criminal adjudication when using scientific evidence for purposes that, strictly 
speaking, the evidence cannot help with. We identify common causes and possible remedies and 
argue that to track uninterpretability, it is necessary to understand what exactly it means to say 
that a piece of evidence is probative in the procedural space of reasons, and how to draw the line 
between informative and non-informative items of evidence.
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Delimiting the scope of inquiry: the model-based view of interpretation. 2.2. Principles of sci-
entific interpretation. 2.3. Role, limitations and necessity of empirical measures of scrutiny for 
forensic science evidence. 2.4. Uninterpretability: conceptualising the frontiers of interpretability. 
2.5. Distinguishing (un-)interpretability from probative value and relevance. 2.6. (Un-)interpreta-
bility vs. inconclusiveness.—3. PROBING FOR (UN-)INTERPRETABILITY. 3.1. Distinguish-
ing between evaluative, investigative and technical reporting. 3.2. Uninterpreted and partially 
interpreted vs. uninterpretable evidence. 3.3. The central role of main objects of litigation and 
propositions in interpretation. 3.4. Exemplifying (un-)interpretability: probabilistic genotyping. 
—4. CONCLUSIONS 
1.  INTRODUCTION
1.1.  Seemingly probative scientific evidence?
It is not an exaggeration to say that the field of evidence & proof has primari-
ly focused—at least for the past few decades—on the reliability of various forensic 
science 1 disciplines. From the ground-breaking Frye 2 decision which set the initial 
standards for scientific validity in the 1920s, widely considered even beyond the 
American context, over the «DNA wars» of the 1990s 3 to the ongoing discussions 
over how to define criteria of scientific validity, 4 scholars, criminal courts and sci-
entific organisations have tried to lay down the procedural and methodological ar-
chitecture for the operation of forensic practitioners in the criminal justice system.
These developments raise the question of what else could and, indeed, should 
have been discussed, in addition to reliability. As we will argue below, the main and 
usually sole requirement for admissibility in criminal proceedings is a core feature 
of forensic scientists’ operations that, so far, is not adequately illuminated. Whereas 
reliability—based on «validity» in the US 5 and «sufficiently reliable scientific basis» 
in England and Wales 6—invokes the exception to the opinion rule which raises a 
general ban on opinions from any other person than the triers of fact, relevance is the 
main requirement for admissibility, save for any exclusionary rules.
1 For the purpose of this paper, forensic science is broadly understood as «the application of scien-
tific or technical practices to the recognition, collection, analysis and interpretation of evidence for 
criminal and civil law or regulatory issues». See President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology (PCAST), 2016: 1, hereinafter cited as PCAST Report, and PCAST as council.
2 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
3 See Aronson, 2007.
4 See the PCAST Report for an example of a report that stirred considerable debate in recent years.
5 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. (509 U.S. 579 [1993]). The Daubert standard is the test 
currently used on the federal level and in several jurisdictions on the state level. In the federal court 
system, it replaced the Frye standard, which, nota bene, is still used in some states.
6 R v Dlugosz [2013] EWCA Crim 2.
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Relevance too seems to be a straightforward topic insofar as it describes a rela-
tionship between two facts. A fact x is relevant to a fact y when the former has some 
material bearing on the latter. For example, to ascribe criminal liability to or acquit a 
defendant, we need evidence which is capable of helping to prove or disprove some 
element of the respective criminal allegation. This is obviously easier said than done. 
Admitting relevant evidence at trial and excluding irrelevant evidence is similar to 
the fictional rugby manager’s instruction «To win, you need to score more tries than 
the other side». An expected response to that can only be: «Sure, but how?» 7
In common law, James Fitzjames Stephen’s classical definition seems to offer a 
helpful approach to criminal courts: «The word “relevant” means that any two facts 
to which it is applied are so related to each other that according to the common 
course of events on either taken by itself or in connection with other facts proves 
or renders probable the past, present or future existence or non-existence of the 
other». 8 Explicit reference to the term «probability» in the above definition has been 
replicated in modern legislature, most notably in FRE 401 (US) according to which 
«Evidence is relevant if (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable 
that it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in deter-
mining the action». Similarly, in England and Wales Lord Simon of Glaisdale noted 
that «Evidence is relevant if it is logically probative or disprobative of some matter 
which requires proof […] It is sufficient to say […] that relevant (i.e. logically pro-
bative or disprobative) evidence is evidence which makes the matter which requires 
proof more or less probable». 9
But before the critical reader is led to think that judges and jury in criminal trials 
deploy any sort of probability calculus to determine relevance and weight, 10 it is 
worth reminding one of the core elements in Stephen’s definition. What is neces-
sary, according to the abovementioned determination, is a vast array of background 
generalisations about the world, contextual information and, often, cultural under-
standing in order to place the evidence into context. The law predicates admissibility 
on relevance, but as Thayer put it, «the law furnishes no test for relevance». 11 It is 
important to note here that background knowledge is neither cognitively present nor 
can it easily be articulated. 
We need to distinguish the laissez-faire approach to, let us call it, normal evi-
dence, as outlined above, from expert opinion evidence. The latter is admissible in 
England and Wales if, inter alia, it is «relevant to a matter in issue in the proceed-
7 See Williams, 1995: 239.
8 Stephen, 1948: art. 1.
9 DPP v Kilbourne [1973] A.C. 729 at 756 HL.
10 See R v Adams [1996] 2 Cr App R 467, 481, 482 (England and Wales), where the Court of Ap-
peal remarked that to «introduce Bayes’ Theorem, or any similar method, into a criminal trial plunges 
the jury into appropriate and unnecessary realms of theory and complexity deflecting them from their 
proper task».
11 Thayer, 1898: 265.
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ings». 12 Experts, however, need to do much more than simply claiming that fact 
x is relevant to fact y. They need to explain why that is the case in their expert opin-
ion. This insight helps us fully grasp the structural difference between relevance for 
non-expert evidence and relevance for expert evidence: in addition to the qualitative 
assessment which is expressed in a binary mode (relevant-irrelevant), experts need 
to lay out their underlying assumptions and invoke/present the respective scientific 
model at play, including the inferential steps which allow them to reach a given 
conclusion, i.e. the quantitative measure of how strongly or weakly (if at all) the 
evidence favours one proposition over the other. An expert, whose duty in England 
and Wales is «to help the court to achieve its aims», 13 thus needs to explain his or her 
«methods», including the «inferential steps», and the extent and quality of the data 
on which the expert’s opinion is based. 14
Although this soft-law instrument provides devices with which court judges can 
decide on the reliability and validity of the proffered method, it is important to note 
that factual relevance is a function of reliability, not vice versa. A reliable method has 
a high degree of specificity and sensitivity. In other words, reliability is a precondi-
tion for relevance. A method whose results are only slightly better than chance barely 
deserves the name scientific. In fact, such a pseudo-method would be reminiscent 
of the diviner’s claim that when he holds the rod, a certain sensation in his hand 
indicates the existence of water five feet under the ground. This fails to establish any 
relationship between the «feeling in the hand» (method) and the empirical fact of 
water being present at certain depth under the ground. 15 Similarly, and in a more re-
alistic context, any polygraphic output cannot indicate the truthfulness or falsehood 
of a statement. 16 Both methods are blatantly unreliable.
Where these requirements cannot be met, we argue here, expert evidence should 
not be adduced in the criminal process. However, forensic science practice is far from 
these theoretical understandings. In many instances, forensic science evidence is used 
to support various strains of argument despite being uninterpretable or, at best, only 
partially interpretable. Such unwarranted uses of evidence, we cannot stress this 
enough, are a cause of concern and call for an inquiry into the understanding of what 
exactly it means to say that a piece of expert evidence is informative and, hence, how 
to probe for evidence interpretability, i.e. the feasibility of assigning probative value.
To illustrate the problem of interpretability, consider a type of forensic science 
evidence that can be presented in a way that should arouse the interest of prosecu-
tors: no matter what the analyst observes, the respective finding can be said to be in 
agreement with the prosecution’s case. Such evidence may seem too good to be true, 
12 CPD V Evidence 19.A.1
13 CPD V Evidence 19B.1.
14 CPD V Evidence 19.A.5(a-c).
15 See Wittgenstein, 1958: 1-15.
16 See Kotsoglou, 2021.
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yet it actually exists. A well-known example is the discipline of firearms discharge res-
idue (FDR, also called gunshot residue [GSR]) analysis. Suppose a case in which the 
analyst reports the finding of particles classified as GSR on the hands of a suspected 
shooter. Suppose also that those particles have the same qualitative composition and 
morphological features as those found in the head hair of the victim and in spent car-
tridges recovered from the crime scene. While there are many subtleties and circum-
stantial aspects to be taken into account in shooting cases, for the illustrative purposes 
here it shall suffice to mention that, at least in principle, forensic literature considers 
the presence of such particles «a positive result». 17 This is so, as is widely thought, 18 
because «GSR is not common to the average’s person daily environment». 19 The exact 
meaning of the proposition that a finding is «positive» pertains to a discussion in its 
own right, ranging from broad views such as understanding «positive» merely in a 
descriptive sense as the presence of target particles (or as a factual statement there-
of ), to stronger views according to which «positive» means incriminating, i.e. having 
probative force in relation to someone’s alleged activities, or even criminal liability. 
But suppose now that a search has been conducted and that no particles were 
found on the hands of a person of interest. Interestingly, such a finding can also be 
presented in a way that suits the prosecution’s case. It suffices to invoke references to 
specialised literature in the field. For example, scientists have asserted that «[t]he ab-
sence of gunshot residue on a person’s hands does not eliminate that individual from 
having discharged a firearm» 20 and that «... negative results [...] are not necessarily 
exculpatory». 21
Thus, both the presence and absence of particles seems to be a useful type of 
evidence for the prosecution. Yet, this seemingly catchall probative property comes 
at a high price: the same findings can also be «fitted» to the narrative of the defence. 
On the one hand, the finding of no particles is what we typically expect to see on 
a person that is not related in any way to the discharge of a firearm. 22 On the other 
hand, any finding of particles raises the question of contamination and, hence, the 
problem of false positives. 23 In view of these diverging assertions, laypersons may 
17 Heard, 2008: 255.
18 We call this a mere thought because, as argued later in §2.2., one cannot directly jump from 
observations to conclusions. In particular, the mere rarity of a given type of evidence among a certain 
group of persons by itself does not make an item of evidence probative.
19 Heard, 2013: 274. 
20 Trimpe, 2011: 29.
21 Schwoeble & Exline, 2000: 127.
22 See also Pole v. Randolph 570 F.3d 922 (7th Cir. 2009) for an example of a case in which the 
appellant argued that the retention of negative GSR findings (i.e. no detected GSR particles) implied 
that vital evidence was kept from the defence («The exculpatory evidence [...] consisted of two favorable 
gunshot residue tests. [Defendant] contended that the swabs of his hands and tests of the glove were 
negative for gunshot residue...», at 930).
23 See also Hudson v. Lafler  Civil No. 04-CV-74001-DT  (E.D. Mich. Jun. 8, 2006) («the 
prosecution’s expert witness admitted that the presence of gunshot residue on a person did not necessa-
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wonder what, if anything, one is logically entitled to conclude without giving undue 
advantage to one of the competing parties to the matter. Expert witness testimony 
and forensic science in general thus has to be antithetical to the approach of Pythia, 
the Oracle of Delphi. For her reply to those going to war («You will go, you will re-
turn not in the war shall you die» 24) could conveniently validate mutually exclusive 
outcomes. She allowed those asking to hear what they wanted to hear.
We thus see that even a slight scratch on the surface features of a given type of 
forensic science evidence readily prompts a host of questions. Namely, the questions 
of what it means to interpret an item of scientific evidence in the first place, what 
an admissible interpretation of evidence is and, more fundamentally, what it means 
to say that an item of evidence is interpretable. Moreover, inquiring about whether 
an item of evidence is interpretable, and to what extent, cannot be separated from 
the questions of the frontiers of interpretability and how those frontiers ought to be 
drawn. In this paper, we aim at investigating these questions in the particular context 
of scientific evidence.
1.2. Aims and scope 
The main thesis defended in this paper is that settling questions regarding the na-
ture of (probative) value—a necessary preliminary to the assessment of relevance—
and the feasibility of ascribing evidential value, hinges upon our ability to cope with 
a notion that we will call, for present purposes, (un-)interpretability. As a device for 
drawing the frontiers of the possibility to assign probative value, the notion of in-
terpretability is not understood here as an abstract property of evidence that could 
be contemplated in the absence of a human reasoner, equipped with knowledge and 
background information regarding the circumstances of the instant case. Instead, in-
terpretability is understood as a function of a reasoner’s assumptions, knowledge and 
understanding about selected target systems, and the intended purpose for which 
evidence is being adduced. In a nutshell, we will call evidence uninterpretable when 
it is not possible to assert whether—and to what extent—evidence is informative 
in one way or another with respect to a contested evidential claim. Underlying this 
definition is the idea of ascertainable meaning with respect to an aspect of primary 
interest in a case. Note that this does not exclude the possibility of evidence being 
interpretable with respect to some other, but subsidiary or even uncontested aspect 
rily indicate that the person had discharged a gun», at 7).
24 The utterance was successful (and profitable) because its meaning changed depending on 
whether the comma was put before or after the word «not». If the former was the case (i.e. «you will go, 
you will return, not in the war shall you die») the person believed that he would survive the battle. If the 
latter was the case (i.e. «you will go, you will return not, in the war shall you die») the person believed 
that he would die. See Yeroulanos, 2016: 421.
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of a case. 25 In other words, interpretability is not an intrinsic feature of the evidence, 
but a relational one. It is predicated on the procedural space of reasons and depends 
on the parties’ specific propositions.
We will investigate the consequences of uninterpretability by pointing out how 
it can undermine subsequent reasoning processes and lead to unwarranted conclu-
sions. An example for this is evidence presented in support of a particular proposi-
tion or claim, but tacitly carried over—in an inferentially flawed way—to support 
the resolution of a disputed matter about which that evidence, in strict terms, is actu-
ally uninformative. This results in a spuriously or a seemingly probative conclusion. 
Where this happens, evidence is «littering», so to speak, the inferential grounds on 
which subsequent juridical decision-making needs to be based. Thus, there is more 
to uninterpretable evidence than it being evidence that doesn’t answer the question.
Section 2 starts by delimiting the scope of inquiry to the science-centred view of 
interpretation. This part provides a working definition of interpretability as applied 
to scientific evidence and its apprehension in legal proceedings. Section 2 will also 
explain where the demand of interpretability comes from and why it is not covered 
by standard measures for evaluating the fitness of forensic science disciplines, such 
as ground-truth testing and related notions such as error rates, foundational validity 
and validity as applied. 26 Section 3 focuses on ways to probe and enact interpret-
ability, especially determining its limits. For this purpose, we will argue that the 
distinction between investigative and evaluative uses of evidence, 27 as well as the 
notion of hierarchy of propositions 28 is crucial. This section also explains the differ-
ences between (un-)interpretability and other commonly encountered notions, such 
as inconclusiveness and probative value. Though this paper is mainly a theoretical 
inquiry, Section 3 will include an example of evidence (un-)interpretability in the 
context of modern DNA profiling, namely probabilistic genotyping. The conclu-
sions, in Section 4, emphasise that uninterpretability is not merely a synonym for 
evidence that does not answer a question of primary interest, nor that it is an end 
itself. Instead, we argue, uninterpretability is a means to an end, that is avoiding the 
use of evidence for conclusions it is not able to support.
25 Uncontested propositions in the adversarial criminal process do not need to be proven.
26 On foundational validity and validity applied see, e.g. PCAST, 2016: 43.
27 Jackson, 2000.
28 Cook et al., 1998a; Jackson & Biedermann, 2019.
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2.  THEORISING (UN-)INTERPRETABILITY  
OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
2.1.  Delimiting the scope of inquiry:  
the model-based view of interpretation
Since the mid-1990s, the term interpretation is «experiencing a steady period of 
evolution» 29 in forensic science. In a landmark paper, a group of scientists of the now 
axed Forensic Science Service (FSS) considered interpretation as the «drawing of ra-
tional and balanced inferences from observations, test results and measurements». 30 
This understanding of interpretation as a cognitive process is the result of an FSS 
project called Case Assessment and Interpretation (CAI). 31 It focused on scrutinising 
and structuring forensic science services towards delivering output that meets the 
needs of the mandating party. These needs, however, are not necessarily defined in 
a narrow sense, specific to scientific evidence. They are not materially different from 
the reasons that drive evidence processing in general and inquiries thereinto. As Ait-
ken et al. put it succinctly: «The essential issue is: what does the evidence mean?». 32 
This question echoes the notion of meaning and the quest for understanding high-
lighted in Section 1.
These developments have been accompanied by a series of scholarly works centred 
around the notion of interpretation of scientific evidence. 33 They focus on the use of 
forensic science evidence (e.g. DNA, glass fragments, etc.) to help consumers of ex-
pert information discriminate between competing propositions of interest regarding, 
for example, the source of recovered trace material (i.e. identification), or alleged 
activities that led to the deposition of trace material, including considerations of phe-
nomena such as transfer and persistence of trace materials. Arguments and principles 
presented in these works rely on, and invoke, concepts of probability and statistics to 
deal with uncertainty. 34 The mathematical nature of these works has equally attract-
ed criticism 35 and, from the mid-1980s on, enthusiastic support. 36 It is important 
to note, however, that these debates over the adequacy of formal methods of rea-
soning mainly concern questions about evidence & proof in legal adjudication as a 
whole, rather than specific items of scientific evidence. 
29 Cook et al., 1998b: 152. 
30 Ibid.
31 For reviews of CAI see, e.g. Jackson et al., 2014; Jackson & Jones, 2009.
32 Aitken et al., 2010: §2.2. 
33 E.g. Aitken & Stoney, 1991; Aitken, 1995.
34 Evett and Weir «view the interpretation problem as one of updating uncertainty in the light 
of new information» (Evett & Weir, 1998: 23). See also Fienberg, 1989, and the two volumes by 
Gastwirth, 1988.
35 For a widely cited critique, see Tribe, 1971.
36 See, e.g. the New Evidence Scholarship movement described by Lempert, 1986, in a contribu-
tion to Symposium on Probability and Inference in the Law of Evidence held at Boston University in 
April 1986.
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At this juncture, it is worthwhile to include a critical distinction regarding the 
term interpretation that is often misunderstood. As mentioned above, when (fo-
rensic) scientists talk about interpretation in the sense outlined above, they mean 
assessing the value of evidence in terms of its capacity to help discriminate between 
competing propositions of interest. Interpretation, thus, is conditioned on the as-
sumptions made by the scientist as well as the specific information available to the 
scientist at the time the interpretation is made. 37 Most importantly, expert witnesses 
are confined—at least in England and Wales—within the questions asked in relation 
to live procedural issues. Yet, this interpretation is not the end of the matter be-
cause «the ultimate value of any particular piece of evidence, scientific or otherwise, 
must always be assessed contextually, in the light of its contribution to the case as a 
whole». 38 This latter dimension of interpretation thus amounts to assessing the value 
of evidence using possibly higher-level propositions—different from those with re-
spect to which the scientist assessed the findings—and using all the information and 
other items available in the case. 
The remainder of this paper will focus on the former, science-centred understand-
ing of interpretation because it is a crucial preliminary to the latter, broader sense of 
interpretation. While the science-centred view of interpretation is well established 
in literature and, to some extent, in practice, 39 there is yet no structured account of 
the frontiers of interpretability, especially of the notion of uninterpretability and its 
implications for advanced stages of the legal process.
2.2.  Principles of scientific interpretation
An early, if not the earliest account of what today is known as the «three pre-
cepts for the forensic scientist» 40 can be found in Evett’s overview of his «person-
al odyssey». 41 In this account, he refers to these precepts as the «the principles of 
our science». 42 
37 Typically, the scientist does not need to know all the information. This is neither practically pos-
sible, nor desirable, because it may bias the interpretation. For example, in the case of glass fragments 
detected on a jumper, task-relevant information includes aspects such as the mode of breaking and the 
time elapsed between the collection of the jumper and the breaking of the window. Whether the person 
of interest confessed, or whether she was identified by an eyewitness is not relevant information for the 
scientist (though it is so for the recipients of expert information). See also National Commission on 
Forensic Science, Human Factors Subcommittee, 2015.
38 Aitken et al., 2010: §3.28. On the notion of inferential contextualism, see Kotsoglou, 2013.
39 See Section 2.2 for references.
40 Evett & Weir, 1998: 29.
41 Evett, 1991: 19-20.
42 Ibid., at 19. Here, by «our science», Evett means forensic science. In later writings, he refers to 
the precepts as principles of «scientific interpretation» (Evett & Weir, 1998: 29) and the «scientific 
approach to interpretation» (Ibid., 245).
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In essence, the three precepts can be summarised as follows: 43
1) The meaning of an item of evidence cannot be assessed in isolation, i.e. with 
respect to only one proposition. 44
2) The relevant questions for forensic scientists are of the following kind: given a 
particular proposition, what is the probability of seeing this evidence? 45
3) In order to assess the strength of the evidence, the scientist must consider 
not only the probability of the evidence (see above point 2) given each proposi-
tion of interest, but also the framework of circumstances. The scientist should ask: 
given the available information (i.e. framework of circumstances), is the evidence 
better conceivable with one proposition (i.e. account of the contested event) rather 
than with the stated alternative? If so, to what extent is the evidence better conceiv-
able with one proposition rather than with the stated alternative? 
The rationale underlying these precepts stems from both formal considerations 
(i.e. inferential logic) and common sense. From a formal point of view, the precepts 
can be recognised as elements of a (statistical) inference method. 46 It is important, 
however, to emphasise that this is merely to say that the precepts are fundamentally 
rooted in formal-logical considerations. There is no suggestion that legal evidence 
or proof processes, as a whole, are a statistical exercise. 47 Instead, the focus here is 
on understanding the common-sense rationale underlying these precepts and their 
role in avoiding logically flawed reasoning. While not commonly presented in legal 
textbooks, 48 the rationale is briefly exposed in the next paragraphs.
Precept number one is about ensuring a balanced perspective. It does so by re-
quiring the consideration of a pair of contrastive propositions. Precept number two 
seeks to ensure that scientists focus on the findings (evidence), given propositions, 
and not the reverse. Indeed, the duty of the expert is not to opine on propositions, 
but to concentrate on the evidence. This may sound counterintuitive, but it suffices 
to consider a reformulation of this precept in the more informal language of causes 
43 For a more recent formulation of these principles, with an emphasis on the framework of cir-
cumstances (i.e. conditioning information) see Evett et al., 2017.
44 A proposition is a statement or assertion about a contested real-world event, that is one version 
of an event of interest. For example, a pair of what are referred to as source-level propositions is «The 
semen came from Mr. B» and «The semen came from some other man» (Cook et al., 1998a: 232). 
Usually, propositions reflect positions held by parties (i.e. prosecution and defense) though there is no 
procedural requirement for a party to specify a proposition.
45 This principle has also been referred to as «the single most important lesson for the logic of 
evaluative forensic science» (Evett, 2009: 159).
46 Specifically, in the case here, the precepts conform to the logic of the likelihood ratio, which is a 
core element of Bayesian statistical inference (Evett, 1991: 19). On the notion of likelihood ratio, see 
also Friedman, 2017: 70.
47 E.g. Evett & Weir, 1998, note: «It is not our claim that Bayesian inference is a panacea for all 
the problems of the legal process. However, we do maintain that it [...] provides insights that are not 
otherwise possible» (at 29). 
48 For notable exceptions, see Friedman, 2017; Dennis, 2017: Chap. 4.
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(propositions) and effects (evidence). Suppose Billy hits a window with a hammer; 
it is not too difficult, then, to conclude that the probability of a broken window and 
fragments of glass landing on the floor and, possibly, on Billy’s clothing, is large. 49 
However, the reverse is not straightforward: given the evidence only (in this case: 
recovered glass fragments), it is not obvious to infer what the cause was, let alone 
to extrapolate from this Billy’s course of conduct. At least one alternative proposi-
tion and more investigation are needed to elucidate the case, a task entrusted to the 
judiciary. 50 The subtle point here is the difficulty of understanding the structure of 
conditional probabilities, which is known to cause serious problems. 51 In particular, 
it is important to stress the difference between, on the one hand, the probability 
of Billy having smashed the window with a hammer given the findings and, on the 
other hand, the probability of the glass findings given that Billy smashed the window.
In turn, precept number three seeks to prevent unwarranted assertions about pro-
bative value. For example, the mere fact that the scientist considers the evidence to 
be well conceivable with a particular proposition (e.g. when saying «if proposition so 
and so is true, then this evidence is what I would expect to see») does not necessarily 
mean that the evidence supports that proposition. The reason for this is not only that 
the evidence may equally well be compatible with the alternative proposition at play, 
and hence be uninformative. 52 It is also important that the evaluation considers the 
framework of circumstances of the instant case. Stated otherwise, an item of evidence 
is not probative in one way or another with respect to a particular proposition in 
abstracto. An item of evidence has value with respect to a proposition A rather than 
proposition B only insofar as the evidence is better conceivable with proposition 
A, rather than B, i.e. if the evidence is better accounted for by proposition A rather 
than proposition B in the light of the task-relevant information (derived from the 
framework of circumstances). 
Though they may seem technical at first sight, these precepts of scientific in-
terpretation can be stated in largely non-technical language, 53 and they are funda-
mental in the sense that many cases of recorded misuse of scientific evidence can be 
reconstructed as a violation of one or more of these principles. 54 This is why they 
have been incorporated in standard and guidance documents for forensic examiners 
49 This example is adapted from Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018: 99.
50 Evett et al., 2017: 19.
51 A typical example is the notorious prosecutor’s fallacy (Thompson & Schumann, 1987).
52 Suppose, for example, that in the above example involving a broken window the alternative 
proposition is that Johnny smashed the window with a hammer, and Billy was a bystander.
53 The precepts can be stated without resort to either probability or statistics. Thus, while a formal 
justification for the three precepts is based on statistical principles and methods, it is not necessary—for 
practical purposes and ease of communication—to label the precepts openly as statistics or statistics 
based, let alone Bayesian.
54 A good example is the case People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319 (1968), discussed in Finkelstein 
& Fairley, 1970. For a more recent example in England and Wales see, e.g. R v Barry George [2007] 
EWCA Crim 2722.
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and legal practitioners, 55 and are regularly reemphasised in the light of controversial 
cases. 56 But, as well-intentioned and mildly constraining these precepts are, a realis-
tic assessment of the current reporting practice of (forensic) scientists must conclude 
that, as a whole, forensic scientists continue to follow a variety of different reporting 
formats and conclusion scales—some of which do not conform to the three princi-
ples exposed above. 57
While the causes of this are operational constraints and adherence to conventional 
procedures, which are managerial topics in their own right, there are two conceptual 
considerations that echo deeper challenges. The first is the widely held view that the 
«problem of scientific evidence» is, first and foremost, an empirical one, i.e. centred 
around the question of whether forensic scientists can reliably do what they claim to 
be able to do. 58 Section 2.3. will briefly address this issue. The second consideration 
has to do with the question of whether the principles of scientific interpretation are 
sufficient as a safeguard against uninterpretability, let alone able to define limits of 
interpretability. This aspect will be addressed in Section 2.4.
2.3.  Role, limitations and necessity of empirical measures  
of scrutiny for forensic science evidence
The discussion so far might have inadvertently alienated legal scholars and prac-
titioners whose perspectives regarding admissibility of scientific testimony are in-
fluenced by the quests for (empirical) validity derived from legal provisions, such 
as FRE 702. The notion of validity has been prominently brought to the broader 
judiciary’s attention in the PCAST Report with its strong emphasis on what the 
Council termed foundational validity and validity as applied. 59 In a nutshell, 
the Council views forensic science as a discipline that renders direct opinions about 
the truth or otherwise of particular propositions 60 (e.g. the proposition that the per-
son of interest rather than an unknown person is the source of a particular trace) 
which is why, the Council considers, it is necessary to require empirical performance 
indicators for this mode of operation. Specifically, the Council notes that «scientific 
55 E.g. Association of Forensic Science Providers (AFSP), 2009; European Network of 
Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI), 2015 (hereinafter cited as ENFSI Guideline); Aitken et al., 
2010. 
56 Aitken et al., 2011.
57 For a review and discussion see, e.g. Thompson, 2019.
58 PCAST, 2016, is a prominent example for this.
59 PCAST, 2016: 42-43, explicitly relates foundational validity and validity as applied to FRE 702 
(c, d).
60 Note that this is contrary to principle no. 2, exposed in Section 2.2., according to which the 
expert should focus on the probability of the findings, given propositions, not the reverse (i.e. focus on 
the propositions given the evidence).
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validity and reliability require that a method has been subjected to empirical testing 
[...] and the error rates are determined». 61
Prima facie, this sounds entirely reasonable, for who can really afford to ignore 
hard data regarding the accuracy of a source of information, i.e. the number of times 
a source of information—using everyday language—«got it right and wrong»? The 
point is that this perspective falls short of the scope of interpretability, which is why 
it is worthwhile to properly distinguish these concepts from one another.
To be clear, there is nothing wrong with false positives and false negatives 62 where 
the concern is process output that conforms to the Council’s description of forensic 
science. Typical examples are cases in which the examiner’s task amounts to applying 
a diagnostic test (e.g. a drug test) and reporting is limited to the actual outcome (i.e. 
positive or negative). However, even in these cases, a factual report of a test’s out-
come, accompanied by an error rate, does not directly inform us about whether or 
not a target proposition (e.g. presence or absence of a detectable amount of a drug) 
is true. 63 Empirical statements—we cannot stress this enough—are probabilistic in 
nature, and categorical conclusions are unwarranted.
The main reason for this is that a conclusion about the truth-value of a proposi-
tion depends on more than a test outcome alone. 64 Moreover, consumers of expert 
information need to critically inquire about the extent to which the aggregate per-
formance measure, e.g. the underlying error rate data, refers to types of cases (and 
related case circumstances) that are comparable to the instant case. 65 Again, this is 
not to say that error-rate data are useless; indeed, they are helpful to inform discours-
es regarding admissibility of a method or technique in general. 66 In other words, 
error-rate data, base rates and similar statistics are—at best—informative, but not 
conclusive, about the single event. This insight reminds us about the conceptual and 
methodological problems in the process of communication between forensic scien-
tists on the one hand and triers of fact on the other hand.
Therefore, once a type of examination (or testimony) is deemed to be admissible 
(unless some exclusionary rule applies), we need to assess the probative value of the 
test outcome in the light of the task-relevant circumstantial information of the case 
at hand. The factual report of the test outcome, accompanied by aggregate perfor-
mance indicators, is an uninterpreted finding. It is uninterpreted because it does not 
61 PCAST, 2016: 46.
62 For a discussion of the topic of error rates see, e.g. Koehler, 2013.
63 For example, there is usually non-scientific data in a case that informs what in more technical 
accounts is called a prior probability (i.e. a probability prior to considering the scientific evidence). See, 
e.g. Parmigiani, 2002: Chap. 1.
64 Ibid.
65 For a call of a more detailed scrutiny of the parameters of the studies from which data are drawn 
and used for assessments in instant cases, see Imwinkelried, 2020.
66 Ibid.
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directly inform the consumers of expert evidence how they should revise, in the light 
of the test outcome, their view on the pair of contrasting propositions of interest.
In order to give the test outcome an interpretation in the sense understood in this 
paper—i.e. the principles of scientific interpretation (Section 2.2.)—one not only 
needs a probability assignment for observing the test outcome (e.g. a positive result) 
given the target proposition (e.g. presence of a detectable amount of illicit substance). 
One also needs the probability of obtaining the test result given the appropriate 
alternative proposition (absence of illicit contents). Common proxies 67 for these 
probabilities are the sensitivity for the former and the probability of a false positive 
(i.e. 1-specificity) for the latter. 68 Combined, these two assessments characterise the 
value of the evidence: the evidence is probative in one way or another to the extent 
that the method’s sensitivity differs from the complement of the specificity (i.e. the 
probability of a false positive). 
Again, this should conform to laypeople’s understanding and common intuition. 
As an example, consider a situation in which the sensitivity is the same as the prob-
ability of a false positive. That is, the probability of obtaining a positive test result 
is the same, regardless of whether or not a detectable quantity of illicit substance is 
present (i.e. the target proposition is true). Such a test result would have no probative 
value. A positive result has probative value if and only if the probability of the posi-
tive result is greater given the first rather than the second proposition, or vice-versa. 
More specifically, the greater the sensitivity compared to the false positive probabil-
ity, the more probative the positive test result is with respect to the first rather than 
the second proposition. 69 Stated otherwise, the smaller the false positive probability, 
compared to the sensitivity, the greater the diagnosticity of the evidence. To summa-
rise, a good test or method should have a high sensitivity and a high specificity (i.e. 
low false positive probability). Thus, interpreting a finding amounts to addressing 
points 1 to 3 exposed in Section 2.2., also known in the context here as «the logic of 
forensic inference». 70
One question that these considerations raise is whether the PCAST Report de-
picts an unsuitable approach to the interpretation of forensic science evidence and 
forensic science as such. Some commentators think so, calling it a «flawed paradigm 
for forensic evaluation». 71 In a less severe view, however, one could argue that the 
PCAST Report focused on attempting a minimal first move ahead because, as men-
tioned above, aggregate performance indicators (e.g. error rates) are an important 
preliminary consideration (i.e. with respect to admissibility). 72 Empirical data to 
67 We use the term proxy here because, strictly speaking, the statistics refer to observations across 
multiple cases, whereas the problem to be dealt with here is assessment in the individual case.
68 Kaye, 1987: 360.
69 Ibid.
70 Evett et al., 2017: 17.
71 Ibid, at 18, and Imwinkelried, 2020.
72 See also Lander, 2017: 367-368.
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help assign probabilities for false positive outcomes are also helpful by providing, 
in certain applications, half of the «equation» stipulated by the three principles of 
scientific interpretation (Section 2.2.). But, by considering only part of the princi-
ples of coherent reasoning, the perspective advocated by the PCAST Report leaves 
scientific evidence essentially uninterpreted. It provides no guidance regarding what 
exactly recipients of expert information are logically entitled to infer from a particu-
lar test result when merely accompanied by an error rate only. 73 Stated otherwise, 
the PCAST report did not proceed to address what may be called the micro-level of 
value of evidence assessment. That is, it stayed at the macro-level of admissibility. In 
this sense, the perspective advocated by the PCAST report abstains from the case-
based assessment of the probative value of scientific evidence. 
Despite all scepticism, it is worthwhile to consider a possible argument in favour 
of the PCAST Report. If one considers that, as mentioned above, black-box-like 
studies represent an essential, though minimal, component of performance assess-
ment, the PCAST report triggered the hope that the field would agree to conduct 
more ground truth testing (i.e. the generation of data for empirical performance 
indicators). 74 Rather disturbingly, however, even that hope set the bar too high for 
some quarters of forensic science that expressed their discontent with the PCAST 
Report’s insistence on empirical grounding. 75 
2.4.  Uninterpretability: conceptualising the frontiers  
of interpretability
Suppose, for the time being, that we accept the PCAST Report’s insistence on 
empirical foundations as an important preliminary to the consideration and admis-
sibility of expert witness testimony in the legal process. Assume further that, on 
the micro-level of interpretation in the instant case, it is reasonable to require that 
the forensic scientist addresses the tripartite question outlined in Section 2.2. These 
questions seek to determine whether, and to what extent, an item of evidence is 
probative with respect to particular propositions of interest. According to this view, a 
probative item of evidence is one that is capable to influence, in one way or another, 
one’s view (or belief ) regarding the propositions of interest. In legal scholarship, the 
73 This is not a problem specific to the PCAST Report. Academics remain vague on how to use 
diagnostic performance measures properly too. For example, Edmond et al., 2014, write «[t]he juror 
can reason with this information to infer something about the particular case» (at 10), without explai-
ning what exactly this inference should amount to and despite the fact that the answer to this question 
is largely available in literature.
74 The authors are grateful to Professor Christophe Champod for this reflection.
75 For a list of published statements in response to the PCAST Report see https://obamawhitehou-
se.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensics_2016_public_comments.
pdf (last accessed March 4 2021).
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latter property is readily recognised as (logical) relevance, 76 a notion that can also be 
reconstructed in probabilistic terms. 77
Broadly speaking, assessing evidence thus means assessing whether the evidence 
is probative with respect to particular propositions of interest. Central to this un-
derstanding is that the value of evidence is a property that depends on the intended 
purpose, the questions of interest in the case at hand (i.e. the litigated matter), 78 the 
assumptions made and the information available to the interpreter at the time an 
interpretation is made. 79
While this working definition of interpretation purports to answer the question 
of what interpreting an item of scientific evidence means, it does not answer the 
question of what an (un-)interpretable item of evidence is. The former, i.e. interpre-
tation, has to do with the logic of inference whereas the latter, (un-)interpretability, 
is an ascription made to a piece of evidence by an interpreter. Prima facie, it might 
be understood as a property of an item of evidence, but ultimately, it hinges upon 
the interpretative capacities of the interpreter. We can now delve deeper into these 
intricate aspects.
The definition of interpretation of scientific evidence through the three principles 
exposed in Section 2.2. allows us to derive a provisional definition of interpretability 
as a substantial property of the relationship between an item of evidence and the 
latter’s interpreter. That is, an item of evidence can be said to be interpretable if and 
only if it is possible to enact the principles of interpretation. 80 In turn, an item of evi-
dence is said to be uninterpretable when the interpreter cannot enact the principles of 
interpretation and, hence, no statement can be given as to the probative value of the 
evidence (i.e. asserting which of the competing propositions, if any, is favoured by 
the evidence over the respective alternative). This definition may seem a statement of 
the obvious, though it is crucial to ask—as emphasised in the remaining parts of this 
paper—whether the mere enaction of the principles of interpretation is sufficient to 
ensure that an interpretation is actually purposeful.
The argument made here is that interpretability is a relational property, in the sense 
that an item of evidence may be interpretable with respect to a given pair of prop-
ositions, but uninterpretable with respect to another pair of propositions. 81 For ex-
ample a DNA profile is, strictly speaking, interpretable mainly as regards the source 
of the biological material, but requires additional considerations when discussed in 
76 For a probabilistic understanding of the term relevance, in the forensic sense, see Stoney, 1994. 
77 E.g. Lempert, 1977; Friedman, 2017: 49-84.
78 Aitken et al., 2010: §2.2.
79 Jackson, 2000: 85.
80 Note, however, that an interpretable item of evidence is not necessarily probative. See §I.E. 
regarding the distinction between interpretability and probative value.
81 As an aside, note also that interpretability may vary across examiners, depending on their level 
of expertise for the evidence in the instant case.
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the context of alleged transfer mechanisms. 82 Again, this may seem obvious, but the 
problem is that in practice, this ambivalence is not always properly acknowledged, 
or even understood, which may result in seemingly probative evidence, leaving vi-
tal considerations of uninterpretability unnoticed—possibly to the detriment of the 
parties.
To account for the ambivalent nature of interpretability, it is helpful to consider 
a distinction between what we call here weak (or, limited) and strong (or, strict) in-
terpretability:
— Weak (or limited) interpretability: evidence is said to have weak (or, limited) 
interpretability if, at best, it is interpretable with respect to a pair of propositions at 
a hierarchically low level, such as source level (i.e. a proposition regarding the source 
from which a trace or mark comes from). 83
— Strong (or strict) interpretability: evidence is said to have strong interpretability 
if it is interpretable at an advanced propositional level, in particular with respect to 
propositions regarding alleged activities.
The pertinence of this distinction is illustrated by the fact that scientists may 
content themselves with limited interpretability, which is problematic because it may 
deprive recipients of expert information from the fact that the evidence is actually 
uninterpretable with respect to higher propositional levels that are closer to the ul-
timate issue of a case. Worse, when left unassisted, recipients of expert information 
may—in an unwarranted way—apprehend weakly interpretable evidence as strongly 
interpretable evidence. At the very least, the notion of weak interpretability empha-
sises the understanding that «[s]ource level propositions [...] may have limited utility 
for criminal adjudication». 84
To illustrate the ambivalent nature of interpretability, consider an example in-
volving DNA recovered on a discarded object, such as headgear, a tool or a weap-
on, found on a scene of investigation: 85 a small quantity of DNA (also sometimes 
called trace or touch DNA) is found on the object. The DNA profile corresponds 
to the DNA profile of a person of interest. Depending on the quality of the DNA 
profile (which may be a partial or complete, mixed or unmixed), the observed cor-
respondence in DNA profiles may be probative with respect to the propositions 
according to which the person of interest rather than an unknown person is the 
82 For more discussion see e.g. Kotsoglou & McCartney, 2021.
83 Regarding the notion of hierarchy of propositions, see Cook et al., 1998a. Broadly speaking, the 
higher a proposition in the hierarchy, the closer it approaches the ultimate issues in a case, and hence the 
more useful an interpretation is for fact-finders. For a recent overview of the hierarchy of propositions, 
see also Gittelson et al., 2016.
84 Aitken et al., 2010: §3.9. For a recent example of this argument in the context of a case invol-
ving small quantities of DNA, see United States v. Gissantaner, No. 19-2305 (6th Cir. 2021).
85 For an example of a real case involving a hat found at a crime scene, see Biedermann et al., 
2011. Similarly, United States v. Gissantaner, supra note 84, involving a weapon.
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source of the DNA. 86 Thus, according to our account, the DNA evidence is inter-
pretable with respect to (sub-)source level propositions. This, however, represents 
only limited interpretability because the source level propositions are distant from 
the ultimate issues to be decided by the triers of fact. The latter are primarily inter-
ested in questions such as whether or not the person of interest is the individual who 
wore the headgear at the crime scene (or handled the weapon at the relevant time, 
etc.). Such propositions are at a higher hierarchical level, and interpretability with 
respect to such propositions would require strong interpretability. However, ensuring 
strong interpretability in this sense is a highly intricate task because it requires more 
than scientific knowledge regarding the rarity of the genetic features. The scientist 
would need to discuss scientific knowledge, if available, regarding phenomena such 
as transfer, persistence and rates of recovery. This requires data from empirical re-
search. When knowledge and data on these topics are scarce, or even missing, the 
scientist may be unable to assess the probative value of DNA profiling results with 
respect to the alleged activities. This inability to enact the principles of interpretation 
will make the evidence uninterpretable at this advanced propositional level (i.e. activ-
ity level), despite the interpretability at source level. As mentioned above, evidence 
interpretability is relational insofar as it refers to a specific proposition, not to some 
intrinsic property of a piece of evidence. 
The critical reader may wonder why this poses a problem and why it is not suf-
ficient that scientists fall back to a less ambitious interpretational level (i.e. source 
level), and thus simply do what they «know best»—after all, this should lead to more 
robust findings. There are two problems with this intuitive idea. First, the operations 
of forensic experts is not an anything-goes activity, for this would run contrary to 
the «good old way» according to which expert witnesses act simply as «helpers of the 
court». 87 Secondly, a critical problem is that consumers of expert information may be 
tempted to carry the evaluation given source level propositions over to a conclusion 
regarding alleged activities—in an argumentatively unwarranted way. 88 This transi-
tion may be unwarranted because, as argued above, such a move requires specialised 
knowledge (e.g. regarding phenomena such as transfer and persistence) which, in 
case of evidence uninterpretability, is unavailable to the scientist. And, if such spe-
cialised knowledge is unavailable to scientists, it is also unavailable for consumers of 
expert information. 
This problem may remain undetected, and thus be aggravated, when the sci-
entist does not alert fact-finders that the evidence is uninterpretable with respect to 
higher-level propositions (i.e. alleged activities). The bottleneck, thus, is lacking spe-
86 Note that, strictly speaking, this would be called sub-source level propositions because the ques-
tion of source only refers to the DNA, not to the trace as such. The reason for this is that because of 
the low quantity of recovered material, the type of biological material (e.g. saliva) form which the DNA 
comes from, cannot be determined. See, e.g. Evett et al., 2002: 521. 
87 Thayer, 1892: 665.
88 E.g. Gill, 2014. 
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cialised knowledge. This creates the danger that laypeople—unaware of the infor-
mational problem—ignore this bottleneck and draw conclusions from the evidence 
despite its uninterpretability with respect to higher-level propositions. 89 Where this 
happens, uninterpretable evidence can litter the paths of reasoning towards pri-
mary matters of litigation (ultimate issues). Such evidence, thus, is only seemingly 
probative.
It follows from the above that whenever the recipient of expert information can-
not be considered to be competent to assess the meaning of evidence with respect to 
more advanced propositional levels (such as alleged activities), and when these levels 
reflect the needs in the case, it is not appropriate for the scientist to limit evidence 
evaluation to only a low propositional level (such as source level). 90 Instead, the sci-
entist should either assess what, if anything, the evidence means with respect to the 
higher propositional level, provided the necessary specialised knowledge is available, 
or else alert the fact-finder that the evidence is uninterpretable with respect to the 
advanced propositional level, because of the lack of relevant specialised knowledge.
Notwithstanding these intricacies, the default mode of assessment, especially in 
forensic genetics, still widely relies on propositions regarding the source of DNA 
(i.e. so-called sub-source level propositions). 91 This includes applications of modern 
probabilistic genotyping 92 software that scientists use to evaluate DNA profiling re-
sults with respect to propositions according to which the person of interest is (or is 
not) the (or one of the) contributor(s) to the DNA in the trace. 93
The sceptical reader may retort that recipients of expert evidence can make dis-
ciplined use of evidence and that they do not unduly extend the value of evidence 
89 This danger is particularly critical whenever the evidence has a high probative value with respect 
to source level propositions (i.e. a hierarchically low propositional level), but not with respect to higher 
propositional levels regarding, for example, alleged activities.
90 This is stipulated, for example, in the ENFSI Guideline: «Propositions are not altered during 
examination/evaluation unless the key  issues in the case and/or the conditioning information have 
changed. For example, when the issues at hand are at activity level, the absence of data or expert 
knowledge on transfer, persistence or background level of the trace type under consideration is not 
a justification to change the set of activity level propositions to a set of source level propositions. In 
fact, the choice between (sub-) source and activity should not be influenced by the availability of data 
or expert knowledge but solely from the consideration of factors such as transfer, persistence and bac-
kground levels that could crucially affect the strength of the findings within the context of the case 
circumstances» (ENFSI, 2015: 13). Similarly, the Recommendation 4 of the guidelines issued by the 
DNA Commission of the International Society for Forensic Genetics specifies: «Propositions should be 
formulated at a level in the hierarchy of propositions, where the forensic scientist brings knowledge that 
is required, but not readily available to the court. This is crucially important when transfer, persistence 
and background DNA have a significant impact on the case» (Gill et al., 2020: 5).
91 On the term sub-source see supra 86.
92 More detailed discussion on probabilistic genotyping is presented later in Section 3.4.
93 Bright et al., 2016; Coble & Bright, 2019; Buckleton et al., 2019 (noting that «PG [proba-
bilistic genotyping] software and other interpretation and statistics methods evaluate the DNA results 
at the subsource level», at 395).
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to an advanced proposition level where the evidence is actually uninterpretable. So, 
what could be wrong then with adhering to an evaluation given source level propo-
sitions?
The problem is that an evaluation given source level propositions is not a gen-
eral solution for all cases. Indeed, in some cases, the question of source may not be 
disputed at all—but then the parties would not need expert evidence to back their 
claims. To continue with the DNA example introduced above, suppose that the 
person of interest concedes that the object (e.g. headgear, weapon, tool etc.) is theirs, 
but then adds that it was lost or stolen, say, sometime prior to the incident. 94 In such 
a case, it may not be contested that the corresponding DNA is that of the person of 
interest. 95 Thus, rather than the issue of source, the competing accounts are whether 
the person of interest is the man who wore the headgear at the crime scene versus 
an unknown person of interest wore the headgear (and that the person of interest 
last wore it, e.g. two weeks ago). Clearly, an expression of the value of the evidence 
with respect to source level propositions is useless here for there is no need to prove 
something that is not contested. Instead, of interest here is only the extent to which 
DNA evidence is capable of discriminating between alleged activities; and, if the 
evidence cannot be assessed with respect to the alleged activities, this means that it is 
uninterpretable at this propositional level, and thus has no probative value. It would 
be unwarranted then to shift attention to a lower, but irrelevant propositional level 
(i.e. source level) for which the evidence may be informative.
2.5.  Distinguishing (un-)interpretability  
from probative value and relevance
Whether or not meaning can be assigned to an item of evidence is, according to 
the view defended in this paper, at the core of the notion of (un-)interpretability. It 
is understood here as a property that characterises the relationship between evidence 
and specific propositions as articulated by the interpreter. It is important, however, 
to draw a distinction with respect to the notion of probative value. In particular, it 
should be emphasised that even though a piece of evidence may be interpretable, i.e. 
is one can enact the principles of interpretation and assign the value of the evidence, 
this does not imply that the evidence is probative. Indeed, an interpretable item of 
evidence may be found to be neutral and, hence, irrelevant. That is, the evidence 
is not probative in one way or another with respect to the competing propositions 
of interest to the fact-finders. 
94 See, e.g. Jackson et al., 2014: 50, for an example of this type of case, involving a balaclava dis-
carded by an offender on the scene of a robbery.
95 Similarly, for example, it is unsurprising to find a DNA profile corresponding to the profile of a 
person of interest on an object that has been seized in the apartment where that person lives (or in that 
person’s car, etc.). For a practical example see, e.g. United States v. Gissantaner, supra note 84.
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Consider Table 1 for a summary of the distinction between (un-) interpretability 
and probative value. Clearly, when the principles of interpretation cannot be enact-
ed, and hence the evidence is uninterpretable, no statement can be made regarding 
the probative value. In essence, thus, an uninterpretable item of evidence provides 
no assistance to anyone who seeks to draw an inference about the competing prop-
ositions of interest—such evidence is not relevant. 96 But this may also happen with 
interpretable pieces of evidence. That is, when the principles of interpretation lead 
the scientist to conclude that whichever proposition is true, the probability of ob-
serving the evidence is the same. Such evidence is interpretable, but not probative 
in one way or another. Evidence is probative in one way or another if and only if 
the evidence is better conceivable with one proposition rather than the respective 
alternative proposition. 97
(Un-)interpretability Probative value: the evidence ...
Weak / strong inter-
pretability (Section 
2.4)
is probative: it sup-
ports the defence  
proposition over the 
prosecution’s propo-
sition
is not probative: does 
not support one 
proposition over the 
other (i.e. the evi-
dence is inferentially 
neutral)
is probative:  
it supports the pros-
ecution’s proposition 
over the defence  
proposition
Uninterpretability No probative value can be assigned
Table 1: Distinction between (un-)interpretability and probative value.
2.6.  (Un-)interpretability vs. inconclusiveness
It is useful to distinguish the concept of (un-)interpretability from other terms 
commonly used by forensic examiners. One such term is «inconclusiveness». This 
term is mainly used by forensic scientists working in disciplines that involve compar-
ative examinations (e.g. fingerprint experts). For example, according to a recent di-
rective by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), called Uniform Language for Tes-
timony and Reports for the Forensic Latent Print Discipline (ULTR), inconclusive is 
(to be) used when «the examiner is unable to identify or exclude the two impressions 
as originating from the same source». 98 According to this definition, 99 the term in-
96 This corresponds to the doctrinal understanding of relevance. See also supra note 76.
97 E.g. Friedman, 2017: 70.
98 U.S. Department of Justice, 2020: 3 (hereinafter cited as ULTR, short for «Uniform Langua-
ge for Testimony and Reports for the Forensic Latent Print Discipline»). 
99 The term inconclusive is used in a variety of forensic disciplines, and the reasons which lead 
examiners to use this conclusion are diverse. For example, it may be that there is simply not enough 
reference material from a known source to conduct meaningful comparative examinations between 
materials from known and unknown source.
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conclusive means that the findings (observations) are such that the examiner cannot 
assert whether or not the person of interest is the source of a recovered fingermark. 
Note, however, that for the logical and procedural reasons explained in Section 2.2., 
expert witnesses should not opine directly on propositions, i.e. express themselves in 
terms of whether a person of interest is the source of a mark or trace. When redirect-
ing the focus on the findings, rather than the propositions, inconclusiveness means 
that the findings are considered not probative in one way or another (i.e. in favour or 
against the proposition of same versus different source). Inconclusive is, in essence, 
taken to mean that the findings are neutral. But even this is not particularly helpful 
because it provides no insight into the deeper reasons for this conclusion.
The notion of (un-)interpretability can help to disentangle the underlying tenets 
and distinguish itself from inconclusiveness. Table 1 clarifies that there are two situ-
ations in which the evidence is uninformative for recipients of expert information. 
Either the scientist was able to assess the probability of the findings given each of two 
competing propositions, but found that they were the same, and hence the evidence 
has no value. Note that according to the considerations exposed in Section 2.4., such 
evidence would be said to be interpretable because the scientist was able to enact the 
principles of interpretation (defined in Section 2.2.). Or, the scientist cannot enact 
the principles of interpretation, a situation in which the evidence is uninterpretable 
and, hence, necessarily uninformative.
More generally, the term inconclusive is internally contradictory because it sug-
gests that one cannot «conclude» anything, yet asserting that the evidence has no 
probative value is as much a conclusion as asserting that the evidence has (some) 
probative value. Further, the use of the term inconclusive presupposes that evidence 
is either categorically conclusive or inconclusive, 100 a view that misconceives the 
reality that most evidence is only probative to varying degrees. For these reasons, 
«inconclusive» is a term that should be avoided altogether, 101 not least because it in-
trigues the consumer of expert information to think that the examiner is presenting 
an opinion on the propositions, or probabilities thereof, rather than a report on the 
value of the findings.
3.  PROBING FOR (UN-)INTERPRETABILITY
Responsible consumers of expert evidence should take an interest in the topic 
of (un-)interpretability because it can help them gain a better understanding of the 
limitations of scientific findings, especially in cases where evidence is only weakly 
interpretable, i.e. at a propositional level that is far away from the questions (ulti-
100 E.g. the ULTR, 2020, states: «The examiner may offer any of the following conclusions: 1. 
Source identification (i.e. came from the same source) 2. Source exclusion (i.e. came from different 
sources) 3. Inconclusive» (at 2).
101 E.g. Cole & Biedermann, 2020.
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mate issues) that the fact-finder has to determine—and possibly uninterpretable at 
more advanced propositional levels, closer to the primary matters that fact-finders 
are concerned with. Exposing the limitations of interpretability should help parties 
guard against unwarranted carrying-over of evidence to advanced levels of the justifi-
catory chain that leads to the final verdict. This section presents and discusses a series 
of considerations that are key to probing for uncertainty as part of a critical review 
of scientific evidence.
3.1.  Distinguishing between evaluative,  
investigative and technical reporting
A useful first step in the review of a report from an expert witness is to understand 
the type of report insofar as (un-)interpretability—being relational in nature—is not 
a cause of concern for all report categories. Questions of (un-)interpretability primar-
ily arise in so-called evaluative reports. An evaluative report is one that reports on the 
observations made during comparative examinations conducted on questioned and 
known materials, 102 and on the probative value the scientist assigns to those obser-
vations in the light of the propositions that reflect the views of the parties at various 
stages in the legal process. 103 Here, the notion of probative value refers to an expres-
sion of strength of support for one proposition compared to its alternative, derived 
by answering the question triad exposed in Section 2.2. It should be emphasised that 
the focus of a genuine evaluative report is on the observations and findings, and their 
discriminative capacity with respect to the propositions of interest—the evaluative 
report must not contain a direct opinion on the propositions, i.e. live issues.
A first urgent remark regarding the requirement outlined above is that the reality 
of forensic reporting is far removed from this confined methodological space. With 
the exception of forensic DNA (to some extent), 104 any fair characterisation of cur-
rent reporting formats reveals that forensic scientists oftentimes opine directly on 
competing propositions, 105 without being prevented by the parties or the courts. For 
example, fingerprint analysts commonly state whether or not (they think that) the 
person of interest is identified as the source of the fingermark found on the crime 
scene. 106 The latter is a statement about a live procedural issue rather than about 
the (probative) value of the similarities and differences observed when comparing the 
102 Questioned material is material whose origin or source is unknown. Typical examples are traces 
(e.g. blood, fibres, etc.) and marks (e.g. toolmarks, fingermarks, etc.) found on a crime scene, victim or 
a person of interest. Known (or reference) materials are materials whose origin is known (e.g. a named 
person or object).
103 E.g. ENFSI, 2015: §1.1 and §2.1.
104 E.g. Gill et al., 2018.
105 For a critical analysis and discussion of current reporting language for federal examiners, see 
Cole and Biedermann, 2020.
106 E.g. Champod et al., 2016; Thompson, 2018: 775.
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questioned fingermark and the reference print of the person of interest. Although 
one might infer that the scientist must have considered the findings to be of (at least 
some) value, and hence interpretable, allowing them to opine directly on proposi-
tions is tantamount to (a) skipping the necessary preliminary stage of assessing the 
probative value of the observations made in the first place and (b) infringing, thus, 
the fact-finder’s decision-making prerogative, which shows disregard for the proce-
dural architecture of modern criminal justice systems, especially—we say this at the 
cost of oversimplification—the criminal process. 107 The former, (a), obstructs any 
insight into how the scientist assessed the value of the observations. Whether that 
assessment was thorough thus remains hidden, unarticulated and, ultimately, escapes 
proper scrutiny.
The above considerations clarify that evaluative reports involve material from a 
known source, i.e. a person or object (tool), that has been compared with some ques-
tioned item of unknown source. The reason for emphasising the need of a careful 
assessment of probative value, according to the principles exposed in Section 2.2., is 
that such an assessment can result in evidence for or against a person of interest. This 
needs to be distinguished from reports that do not involve results of comparative 
examinations with a potential source—and hence do not tend to directly impli-
cate a person of interest. For example, during early stages of an investigation, when 
only questioned material from the crime scene is available, but no potential source, 
examiners may examine traces to provide information useful for investigation. For 
example, based on blood stains allegedly left by the offender at the crime scene, an-
alysts may provide information regarding the DNA profile that the offender must 
possess. 108 Similarly, in a hit-and-run case, the examination of paint fragments found 
on the scene of the incident can reveal information regarding the (type of ) vehicle 
that was involved. In such cases, the examiner’s report is confined to describing the 
features of recovered material only. Such reporting is also sometimes called technical 
or investigative reporting. 109
The above distinction between evaluative and investigative reporting is not nec-
essarily neat. For example, it may be argued that a report is evaluative even though it 
involves no direct comparison with a potential source (person or object). For exam-
ple, in the case of a seized substance, analyses may reveal the presence of a drug which 
may result in charges against a person of interest. Thus, strictly speaking, measure-
ments and results should be assessed in the light of two competing propositions, e.g. 
that the material does (or does not) contain a detectable quantity of illicit substance. 
While this could be seen as an instance that raises the problem of (un-)interpretabil-
ity, it is also possible to look at this type of case as an example of classification. This 
107 See Biedermann & Kotsoglou, 2018.
108 Stoney, 1994: 18. 
109 It is worth noting, however, that evaluative reporting often involves elements of technical repor-
ting, in particular sections that report on the features of the recovered materials. ENFSI, 2015: §1.1.
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is a task that seeks to determine the nature of examined material by assigning it to a 
particular category (e.g. illicit versus legal substance). The ENSI Guideline, for ex-
ample, considers this type of reporting (classification) as technical because it is only 
concerned with ascertaining the nature of recovered material. 110
The distinction between technical and evaluative reporting is important because 
it can help guard against the unwarranted use of investigative information for evi-
dence and proof purposes at more advanced stages of the legal process. Suppose, for 
example, that a technical report asserts that the fragments of paint found on a victim 
in a hit-and-run case are blue and composed of several distinct layers. While this 
information may be helpful to direct investigations (i.e. searching a certain type of 
blue vehicles), it is unsuitable for direct use as evidence against a person of interest 
who is found to have a blue car. The reasons for this are, first, that detailed compar-
ative examinations would need to be conducted between the recovered fragments 
and control material from the car of the person of interest. Second, the value of the 
observed similarities and differences would need to be assessed with respect to a pair 
of competing propositions (e.g. the recovered fragments come from the car of the 
person of interest vs. an unknown vehicle). Only such comparative examinations 
and the assessment of the probative value of their outcomes can lead to a proper 
evaluative report.
3.2.  Uninterpreted and partially interpreted  
vs. uninterpretable evidence
Having clarified that interpretation in evaluative settings (as opposed to investi-
gative settings, Section 3.1.) requires the forensic expert to consider a bipartite ques-
tion, that is the probability of the observations (findings) given a pair of contrasting 
and competing propositions and the task-relevant information (Section 2.2.), we can 
now use this framework to delineate different interpretational limitations.
A common objection against the principles of evaluative reporting is that the 
requirement for at least one alternative proposition could be misunderstood as a 
practical obligation. Clearly, to ensure helpfulness, the contrasting set of proposi-
tions that the forensic scientist must take for granted when assessing the probative 
value of the findings maps on the actual procedural claims of the parties. But this is 
an empirical rather than a doctrinal observation, and does not necessarily map neatly 
on real litigation tactics in each case. For the defendant has the right to remain silent 
or can put forward some other claim.
Yet, at the time when forensic experts write their reports, they may not have 
been provided with an alternative proposition because, strategically, the defence may 
choose to remain silent until they learn what the scientist has observed (e.g. whether 
110 ENFSI, 2015: §5.0 («Reporting, technical (factual)»).
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or not there is a correspondence between the DNA profile of the crime stain and the 
DNA profile of the defendant, or whether any DNA is found at all). In the absence 
of an alternative proposition, there are—according to the ENFSI Guideline 111—
three options that the scientist may follow, two of which will leave the findings 
uninterpreted:
1) Adopt an alternative proposition that, given the circumstances of the case, 
most suitably reflects the position of the party.
2) Adopt no alternative proposition.
3) Present a range of plausible explanations of the findings.
It is important to note that only option 1 can lead to a proper evaluative report, 
because the evaluation will be based on a pair of competing and mutually exclusive 
propositions. However, although experts should be prepared to review their evalu-
ation of the findings when they are provided with a proposition other than the one 
assumed by default, option 1 remains tricky. In fact, it is problematic for a party to 
leave the choice of an alternative proposition to the scientist because the scientist’s 
choice may result in an evaluation that is less favourable for the party of interest than 
it could be. 112 
Option 2 implies that the scientist cannot enact the principles of interpretation, 
thus leaving the findings uninterpreted. 113 When there is only one proposition, 
the scientist may, at best, assess the extent to which the findings may be expected 
to occur given the single proposition available. This amounts to working half-way 
through the principles of interpretation (Section 2.2.), meaning that the findings can 
be considered only partially interpreted. Most importantly, however well conceiva-
ble the findings may be with the single proposition available, no statement can be 
made about the credit (or, support) the findings provide for the single proposition 
available. For example, when there is a biological stain (evidentiary item) with a 
DNA profile that corresponds to the DNA profile of a person of interest, this ob-
servation—taken on its own—has no probative value as long as the scientist has not 
considered the findings in the light of at least one alternative proposition. In particu-
lar, there are no logical grounds to assert that the observed correspondence in DNA 
profiles somehow supports the proposition according to which the person of interest 
is the source of the DNA stain, however appealing such a conclusion might appear.
Option 3 is more subtle. It amounts to the scientist exploring a list of explana-
tions for the findings, and perhaps ranking those explanations according to their 
plausibility. There are two caveats with this option. The first is that explanations, 
111 ENFSI, 2015: §4 (Guidance note 1).
112 It is well known, for example, that in a case where the source of a DNA stain is contested, the 
default alternative proposition that the DNA comes from an unknown and unrelated person tends to 
maximize the probative value (Buckleton & Triggs, 2005).
113 See ENFSI, 2015: §4 (Guidance note 1): «in the absence of an alternative proposition, it is 
impossible to evaluate the findings».
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as understood by scientists, are not the same as formal propositions used in the 
standard evaluative setting (Sections 2.2. and 3.1.). Propositions are formal, spec-
ified by the parties and strictly anchored in the framework of circumstances of the 
instant case. In turn, explanations produced by scientists may be open-ended and 
exploratory (or even speculative) without necessarily being rooted in the case-spe-
cific circumstances. 114 Often, such explanations are provided almost by default, 
as a deflecting shield, 115 without even inquiring about whether they are pertinent to 
the case at hand. 116 While this may be suitable at the investigative stage, i.e. when the 
questions of interest focus on what happened and how, contemplating explanations 
cannot lead to an evaluative report understood in the sense explained in Section 
3.1. An evaluative report states the value of the findings for discriminating between 
propositions of interest that specify an individual or object as the source of a mark 
or trace, or well-defined activities whereby the mark or trace has been generated. 117 
Thus, recipients of expert information should keep in mind that an explorative re-
port in the sense of option 3 does not represent an evaluative report in the sense of 
the criteria of interpretation exposed in Section 2.2. An explorative report leaves the 
observations and findings uninterpreted. Explaining the findings and interpreting 
findings are two fundamentally different tasks.
The above situations illustrate practical and procedural obstacles that can prevent 
scientists from enacting the principles of interpretation, thus leading to uninterpret-
ed or, at best, only partially interpreted evidence. The proposed report categories can 
help recipients of expert information understand the nature of experts’ reports (or 
testimony), recognize their limitations and identify instances where the probative 
value of the evidence remains undetermined. This is the case for situations 2 and 3 
as outlined above.
Notwithstanding, it is important to remind that even in a case corresponding to 
situation 1, i.e. when the scientist evaluates the findings with respect to at least two 
competing propositions, there is no guarantee that the evidence is actually interpret-
able. As an example, consider again the hypothetical case presented in Section 2.4., 
where a small quantity of DNA was detected on an item handled by an offender 
(e.g. headgear, tool, etc.), and discarded on the crime scene. When the DNA profile 
of the trace corresponds to the DNA profile of the person of interest, it is not an 
easy task to assess the value of this correspondence with respect to so-called activity 
level propositions, e.g. the person of interest wore the balaclava at the relevant time 
vs. the person of interest wore the item a few weeks ago (before it went missing or 
114 Evett et al., 2000.
115 The idea of a deflecting shield is the protection of the scientist against accusations of not provi-
ding an exhaustive list of all conceivable explanations of the evidence. 
116 For an example see, e.g. the default statements provided in the context of gunshot residue 
analyses mentioned in Section 1 of this paper. 
117 Cook et al., 1998a.
28 ALEX BIEDERMANN - KYRIAKOS N. KOTSOGLOU
Quaestio facti. Revista Internacional sobre Razonamiento Probatorio / International Journal on Evidential Legal Reasoning  
Año 2022 N. 3 pp. 1-35 DOI: 10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i3.22599
got lost). 118 The difficulty of assessing the findings given such propositions is due 
to the fact that data on phenomena such as transfer and persistence of DNA under 
the circumstances of the instant case are scarce. Specifically, when the scientist can-
not assess the probability of observing the DNA findings given each activity level 
proposition and the task-relevant case information, this means that the principles 
of interpretation cannot be enacted, and hence that the evidence must be consid-
ered uninterpretable at this propositional level, despite possible interpretability at 
source level. It is also important, at this juncture, to recall the practical implication 
of uninterpretability and to emphasise the critical need for parties to understand this 
implication: uninterpretable evidence means that it provides no assistance to anyone 
asked to decide which of the competing propositions is true.
3.3  The central role of main objects of litigation  
and propositions in interpretation
Successfully probing evidence for (un-)interpretability hinges upon one’s ability 
to keep track, as pointed out in Section 2.4, of the relational nature of evidence 
(un-)interpretability. That is, the feasibility of ascertaining evidential value can vary 
as a function of the propositions with respect to which the evidence is assessed, the 
available task-relevant information and any additional assumptions made. But, if the 
value of evidence depends on the propositions being considered, how should one de-
fine propositions suitably? This is a crucial question because expert reports are often 
unclear about the reasons that led to the definition of the propositions that have been 
retained. Experts have a natural tendency to shape propositions in such a way that 
their findings will be interpretable with respect to the chosen propositions. How-
ever, as emphasised in Section 2.4., interpretability is not tantamount to, nor does 
it guarantee or imply helpfulness. Interpretability merely means that the expert can 
enact the principles of interpretation. Whether they should enact these principles in 
a given way is contingent on procedural circumstances: the claims that parties bring 
forward and the claims that remain disputed. Remember that forensic science serves 
the purposes of criminal justice, not vice versa. For example, a person of interest may 
not contest that an item (e.g. headgear, tool, etc.) is theirs, and hence them being 
the source of trace material (e.g. DNA, fingermarks etc.) found on the item. Instead, 
there may be disagreement over the activities that led to the deposition of DNA or 
fingermarks on the item of interest. Clearly, there is no need to adduce evidence for 
an uncontested issue. Thus, as noted by Aitken et al., it is important to understand 
what the main object of litigation is: 
118 Recall that the question of source (i.e. whether or not the DNA comes from the person of 
interest) may not be of interest because the person of interest may not contest that the item or object is 
theirs. Instead, they may contest the way (i.e. activity) that led to the deposition of DNA on the item 
or object. For further discussion, see Section 3.3.
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One cannot assess whether evidence is successful in proving a matter in issue until one knows 
what the issue is and how the evidence relates to it. This observation might sound banal; but it 
is not. In fact, nearly all of the reasoning errors [...] are either variations on, or are at least exac-
erbated by, an elementary failure to identify, with sufficient care and particularity, the question 
which the evidence is capable of answering. 119
A corollary for parties thus is that they should insist on the understanding that, 
first, the meaning of evidence depends on the intended purpose(s) for which it is 
adduced (i.e. the primary object of litigation), and hence, second, that it is these ob-
jects of litigation—not minimal interpretability—that define the propositions with 
respect to which evidence is to be evaluated. If that may result in evidence being 
uninterpretable, then this is worthy of being exposed. This is vital, especially for the 
defence. Indeed, it would be disingenuous to change propositions away from the 
principal matters of litigation for the sole purpose of making the evidence interpret-
able (though with respect to an uncontested aspect of the case). Such evidence, if un-
interpretable with respect to the principal questions, will remain so; interpretability 
with another set of non-principal questions is prone to lead to seemingly probative 
evidence. That is, it is prone to being carried over to a conclusion that the evidence 
cannot logically support. 
3.4.  Exemplifying (un-)interpretability:  
probabilistic genotyping
Probabilistic genotyping (PG) is the combined use of biological models, statis-
tics and computational methods to help assess complex DNA profiling results, 120 
in particular traces with DNA from more than one person (i.e. DNA mixtures). 
Various software solutions exist to practically implement PG and they are regularly 
debated in courts. 121 PG aims at quantifying the probative value of DNA profiling 
results with respect to propositions according to which a person of interest is, or 
is not, a contributor to the detected DNA together with, in both propositions, a 
certain number of other individuals (e.g. claimant and/or unknown person(s)). 122 
This type of assessment is fundamentally compatible with the principles of inter-
pretation exposed in Section 2.2.: the assessment informs about the probability of 
obtaining the DNA profiling results given competing propositions regarding the 
source(s) of the detected DNA. Thus, the output of applying PG in an instant case 
is an assessment of the probative value of the DNA profiling results with respect to 
particular propositions. More specifically, these are called sub-source level proposi-
119 Aitken et al., 2010: §3.3.
120 E.g. Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods (SWGDAM), 2015; AAFS 
Standards Board, 2020.
121 E.g. United States vs. Gissantaner, 2019 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 178848, 2019 WL 5692183 
(W.D.Mich. Oct. 16, 2019) and United States v. Gissantaner, supra note 84. 
122 E.g. Buckleton et al., 2019: 395-396.
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tions 123 which, according to the framework exposed in Section 2.4., lead at best to 
weak interpretability. The reason for this is that such propositions are distant from 
so-called activity-level propositions that more closely approach the principal issues 
of interest to fact-finders. Most importantly, it is crucial to understand that a brute 
PG result is uninformative with respect to activity level propositions. Recall that, as 
mentioned in Section 2.4., an evaluation of the findings with respect to more ad-
vanced propositional levels requires specialised knowledge regarding aspects such as 
transfer and persistence of DNA in the light of the circumstances of the instant case. 
But Buckleton et al. insist that this is beyond the scope of PG: «Discussion of transfer 
and persistence [...] has nothing to do with PG». 124 Consumers of expert informa-
tion should thus carefully distinguish between a PG result and an assessment of the 
findings for higher-level propositions. While the former, PG, may lead to impressive 
numbers, it is critically important to resist temptations to let such assessments un-
duly influence reasoning paths concerned with the latter, higher propositional levels 
regarding alleged activities.
For illustration, consider a hypothetical case in which A was physically assaulted 
by a man, resulting in serious injury. 125 Part of the uncontested case circumstances 
is that A fought with the offender, grabbing his clothing and his skin vigorously. 
Shortly after the assault, A’s nails were swabbed for subsequent DNA analyses. Sup-
pose that the DNA profiling analyses led to a DNA mixture showing a major and a 
minor contributor corresponding to, respectively, the DNA profiles of A and B. The 
defendant, B, denies any involvement. Further, B asserts that he had been scratched 
by A a few days ago during a minor argument, resulting in A reacting hysterically 
and disproportionally. Therefore, it might not be surprising —B says— to find a 
DNA profile that corresponds (partially) to his DNA, as is the case with a mixture 
between A’s and B’s DNA. In this case, both parties acknowledge that some sort of 
physical aggression has indeed occurred. This, in turn, can justify the assumption 
that the source of the DNA is not contested. It is the timing and, maybe, the intensi-
ty and duration of the quarrel over which there is disagreement. Hence, conducting 
PG would not directly help with a primary object of litigation except, maybe, with 
helping to narrow the circle of individuals to investigate. Recall that PG would only 
provide a result with respect to propositions regarding persons who contributed to 
the DNA trace, yet the question of source is not contested in this case.
Instead, what is contested, are activities, as is reflected by propositions of the 
following kind: «B has been assaulted by A» vs. «an unknown man has assaulted A 
(but A scratched B a few days prior to the assault)». Stated otherwise, the reasoning 
is directed towards discriminating between competing versions regarding the way 
by which, and the timing, DNA was deposited under/on A’s nails. Assessing the 
123 On the concept of sub-source level propositions, see supra note 86.
124 Buckleton et al., 2019: 395.
125 The authors are grateful to Dr. Tacha Hicks for suggesting this case example.
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probability of seeing the DNA profiling results given each of these propositions, and 
the case-specific circumstances, requires expert knowledge (e.g. structured data from 
experiments under controlled conditions) regarding the transfer and persistence of 
DNA under circumstances comparable to the alleged activities in the instant case. 
Such expertise may be scarce, or fragmentary, leading to only limited, if any, capacity 
to discriminate between the two propositions of interest, not least because the two 
alleged activities are similar in nature, differing only in timing. Should the scientist 
be unable to assess the findings with respect to the proposition regarding the alleged 
activities and circumstances, then the DNA profiling result would need to be con-
sidered uninterpretable at this propositional level. Further, the scientist should not 
be allowed then to retreat to reporting results of PG because the output of such an 
analysis would refer to other propositions (i.e. the source of DNA), however proba-
tive the findings may be with respect to such propositions. Indeed, there is no need 
to adduce evidence for propositions that are not contested. Doing otherwise is prone 
to let PG output unduly affect inference about a propositional level regarding which 
the evidence is actually lacking interpretability. 
4.  CONCLUSIONS
This paper started with the observation that evidence, as we perceive it, is not 
necessarily what the mainstream view in forensic science claims to be. Real-world 
evidence, irrespective of its nature, does not come with a built-in, self-explanatory 
account of its probative force, i.e. with meta-rules of assessment. At the same time, 
the terms «interpretation» and «interpretability», though commonly used in scien-
tific research and judicial practice, remain largely undefined in the context of expert 
evidence.
As a main strain of argument, this paper advocated a rule-governed, balanced and 
logically defensible definition of interpretability, based on principles derived from 
formal methods of reasoning, called here the principles of interpretation (Section 
2.2.). We have equated (un-)interpretability with the forensic expert’s (in-)ability 
to enact minimal principles of logical reasoning applied to expert evidence. Central 
to this view is that, fundamentally, interpretability is not an inherent or, as it were, 
an axiomatic property of evidence, but a function of the purpose for which it is 
adduced, and the specialised knowledge and expertise available to the scientist, nec-
essary to relate evidence meaningfully to the circumstances of the instant case. Being 
contrastive by design, evidence analysis focuses on providing an assessment of the 
extent—which may well be nil (remember: interpretability does not necessitate rel-
evance)—to which the evidence is able to discriminate between competing proposi-
tions of interest, but abstaining from providing a direct opinion on the propositions 
and litigated matters that are in the fact-finder’s area of competence.
Though it can be considered a substantive property of the relationship between 
evidence and its analyst, interpretability is actually underspecified and underrecog-
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nised in practice, thus rendering evidential processes vulnerable to unwarranted in-
ferential reasoning, possibly detrimental to litigants. Specifically, where interpretabil-
ity with regard to low-level case aspects, such as the source of evidential material, is 
carelessly extended to higher-level questions, such as alleged activities, uninterpreta-
bility may undermine or—as we argue in this paper—«litter» the fact-finders’ infer-
ential paths. Stated otherwise, where informational gaps due to uninterpretability are 
misconceived, actively ignored or concealed, evidence is prone to become seemingly 
probative for issues for which it is actually uninformative. 
In all, there is more to «uninterpretability» than merely referring to evidence that 
does not answer a question of primary interest, i.e. an ultimate issue. Probing for un-
interpretability is not the ultimate goal, but a means to an end. It is about ensuring 
the proper elicitation of the meaning of evidence, i.e. the rules for its use, and the 
avoidance of conclusions that go beyond the realm of what is logically warranted. 
Sceptical readers might argue that the insistence on the notion of (un-)interpretabil-
ity is redundant because triers of fact may be able to proceed responsibly without it. 
This paper has argued that this would be short-sighted insofar as it presupposes that 
controlling for (un-)interpretability could be achieved in the absence of any inferen-
tial framework. Moreover, as we have shown, legal provisions are vulnerable to, or 
even tolerant towards, evidence whose probative value cannot be assessed.
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